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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ACCESSING THE LAW
PREFACE

In this special section we feature articles that continue to
address questions of access to the law initially raised in The
Journal by Judge Richard Arnold' and that also address the
related problems posed by the application of technological
advances to appellate practice. Judge Arnold's essay has
spawned a major round of academic3 and judicial4 comment on
the topics of access to and reliance on opinions not designated
1. See Richard. S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. Prac. &
Process 219 (1999).
2. We have considered this topic before. See generally 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 229473 (2000) (including, among other articles, George Nicholson, A Vision of the Future of
Appellate Practice and Process, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 229 (2000); Lynn Foster &
Bruce Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal Research, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process
275 (2000); Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J.
App. Prac. & Process 305; J. Thomas Sullivan, Redefining Rehearing: "Previewing"
Appellate Decisions Online, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 435 (2000); and Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
& Ronald W. Staudt, The 1% Solution: American Judges Must Enter the Internet Age, 2 J.
App. Prac. & Process 463 (2000)).
3. See e.g. Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions and "No Citation" Rules, 3 J. App.
Prac. & Process 169-451 (2001) (including eleven essays and articles addressing the issues
of publication and prohibitions on citation of unpublished opinions). The current state of
the debate is cogently summed up by Stephen R. Barnett in his essay, From Anastasoff to
Hart to West's FederalAppendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App.
Prac. & Process 1 (2002).
4. The best known discussion appears in Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
2001), in which Judge Kozinski took issue with Judge Arnold's historical analysis of
Article IH as a basis for elimination of "no citation" rules.
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for publication by appellate courts. As with all important
questions of policy, the use of publication as a determinant of
the precedential or persuasive value of prior decisions opens the
doors of the intellectual marketplace for consideration of widely
divergent points of view and related subjects. In this
marketplace, appellate specialists thrive, being trained in
argument and reasoning by analogy.
The articles in this section expand the discussion initiated
by Judge Arnold's essay and his subsequent panel opinion in
Anastasoff v. United States.5 They provide historical perspective
and analyze contemporary phenomena that those seriously
interested in the integrity of the appellate process should find
compelling. The continuing attention paid to publication and
"no citation" rules reflects the philosophical and practical
importance appellate courts attach to publication decisions,
which essentially rank their opinions in terms of their
importance for future litigation.
As the historical sweep of Kenneth Ryesky's opening essay
demonstrates, the uncertainty engendered by the debate over
citation practice and the use of unpublished opinions is not
without precedent. Intertwined as they are with the availability
of online sources that have ended our dependence on the
publication decisions of appellate courts, issues related to the
use and citation of appellate opinions appear to the legal
historian as only among the most recent in a continuing series of
changes that improvements in technology have forced upon
appellate practice and process.
Another important consideration for appellate advocacy
and decisionmaking-the use of and reliance on *data available
from online sources-is examined by Coleen Barger, The
Journal's developments editor, who documents the recurrent
problem of disappearing and inaccurate data. She notes the
actual and potential problems posed by judicial reliance on
online sources of information that too often pose troubling
consequences for the integrity of resolution when online data are
inaccurate, altered, or subsequently deleted from an online
source. Another aspect of the same problem is addressed by
Deirdre Mulligan and Jason Schultz, who advocate the creation
5. 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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of digital archives to ensure that the sort of cultural and historic

information often relied upon by appellate courts (and of course
by others) is not removed from, or simply withheld in the first
instance from, the public domain.
Finally, the decisionmaking process by which some
opinions are credited as publishable and others are not, a process
of principal significance to the operation of both no-citation
rules and informal rules that operate to limit the precedential or
persuasive value of unpublished opinions, is characterized by a
flexibility that often draws fire from opponents. Eugene
Anderson, Mark Garbowski, and Daniel Healy criticize a
particularly curious aspect of the decisionmaking authority of
appellate courts that permits the withdrawal, vacation, or
depublication of previously issued statements of law.
The impact of technological change on both advocacy and
decisionmaking at the appellate level appears unlikely to abate.
As the articles in this mini-symposium suggest, that impact
demands that practitioners and appellate judges alike give
serious consideration to the ways in which traditional appellate
process must change in order to accommodate the realities of a
world in which the flow of digital information is not only
accelerating, but changing the notions of stability that underlie
our very understanding of the law.
JTS
Little Rock
December 31, 2002

